

NIE 45

(Planning Project No. 24)

PRIORITY: Routine

Task Team:

(Chairman)

Subject: Soviet Political Objectives and Tactics to Mid-1952, with Special Reference to a Possible Soviet 'Peace' Offensive and Its Effect on Board Members Associated: Western Rearmament*

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PROJECT

IAC directs
NEB initiates
CES issues memo

13 Aug 51

TERMS OF REFERENCE

TT submits draft	20 Aug	resubmits	resubmits	
CES comments	20 Aug	comments	issues for NEB	21 Aug
NEB considers	29 Aug	reconsiders	reconsiders	
TT redrafts		redrafts	redrafts	
NEB approves for consideration		IAC Reps		
CES edits		issues for distribution	IAC Reps	5 Sep
IAC Reps consider	10 Sep	reconsider	reconsider	
O/NE ()		O/NE	()	
IAC Reps approve				10 Sep
CES edits		issues for distribution	IAC Agencies	11 Sep

ESTIMATE

SD Prelim Dr Due	21 Sep		
IAC contributions due			
IAC contributions rec'd	()	()	()
TT briefs NEB			
TT submits draft		resubmits	resubmits
CES comments		issues for NEB	
NEB considers		reconsiders	reconsiders
TT redrafts		redrafts	redrafts
NEB approves for consideration		IAC Reps	
CES edits		issues for distribution	IAC Reps
IAC Reps consider		reconsider	reconsider
O/NE ()		()	()
IAC Reps approve			
CES edits		issues for distribution	IAC Agencies
IAC considers		reconsiders	reconsiders
O/NE ()		()	()
IAC approves for publication			

Publication

* Changed to: The Likelihood, Nature, and Consequences of a Soviet Attempt to Achieve a Relaxation of ~~Security~~ Tensions

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Cancelled by IAC
14 Apr 52

11 June 1952

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR NIE-45: PROBABLE ATTITUDES AND
POLICIES OF THE FREE WORLD TOWARD THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT,
ASSUMING SOVIET BLOC POLICIES DESIGNED TO PROMOTE A
RELAXATION OF EAST-WEST TENSIONS IN ORDER TO WEAKEN
WESTERN UNITY AND RESOLUTION

(Draft for Board consideration)

THE PROBLEM

To examine possible tactics the Soviet Bloc might pursue within the framework of the assumed policies, and to estimate the probable attitude and policies of the Free World, assuming such policies are pursued, through mid-1954.

SCOPE

This estimate will not consider the likelihood of Soviet Bloc policies along the assumed lines, but will assume that "generally cautious" policies will be pursued during the period of the estimate. The limits of "generally cautious" policies can be defined only in terms of the result sought -- to divide and confuse the Free World and to avoid arousing and uniting it in opposition to the Soviet threat. Identifiable Soviet or Satellite military aggression would be excluded. On the other hand, the assumed policies

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would presuppose no change in ultimate Soviet aims. They would also exclude even temporary major Soviet concessions involving the acceptance of any substantial setbacks, psychological or otherwise, to the prestige of World Communism. *

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. WHAT TACTICS MIGHT THE SOVIET BLOC PURSUE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ASSUMED POLICIES?

A. How and to what degree might the Soviet Bloc engage in the following:

1. Peace campaigns and conciliatory propaganda?
2. Discussion of disarmament and atomic energy control proposals?
3. Efforts to increase East-West trade in strategic and other materials?
- ① → 4. More friendly behavior by Soviet citizens and diplomats abroad and the easing of access to and travel within the Soviet bloc? Would US representatives be included in such gestures?

* DI/USAF ^{wishes} would prefer to include such temporary major/concessions as Soviet acceptance of UN investigation or free elections in East Germany, or the withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany. By this footnote, DI/USAF is invited to submit additional sections reflecting consideration of these points, for discussion at the meeting of IAC representatives. Soviet

6. Popular front tactics and the avoidance of extreme violence by local Communist parties in the Free World, especially in Western Europe?
7. The release of prisoners such as William Oatis, missionaries held in China, etc?
8. Other tactics of a character clearly consistent with the assumed policies?

B. To what extent might the Soviet Bloc pursue the following courses of action consistently with the assumed over-all policies:

1. Signature of an Austrian peace treaty? Would this constitute a "major" concession in the eyes of the Kremlin?
2. Covert support of local Communist subversion in Iran? In Burma? Elsewhere? To what extent could such support be carried out without incurring adverse results in terms of the objectives of the assumed policies?
3. Anti-US propaganda? What themes and lines might such propaganda pursue consistently with the objectives of the assumed policies?

(8) 4. —————>

5. ~~Other~~ Other courses of action not necessarily consistent with the assumed policies but that could be so if carried

out in certain ways?

(Special attention should be given to actions policies designed to set off the US against the rest of the Free World, or members of the Free World against each other.)

(C) →

- D. In addition to identifiable Soviet bloc aggression, what other courses of action could not be pursued consistently with the assumed policies:

1. Expansion of the Korean war?

~~2. Measures designed to render the Western position in~~


Berlin or Vienna untenable, at least in the short and medium term?

~~3.~~

Other?

II. ASSUMING THE ABOVE TACTICS, AND COURSES OF ACTION, WHAT WOULD BE THE PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ATTITUDES AND POLICIES OF THE FREE WORLD TOWARD THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT THROUGH MID-1954?

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- A.  What would be the probable developments in the attitude and policies of the government, principal present opposition *(that might come into power in the period of this estimate)* elements, and influential groups toward the following:

1. Support of NATO program?
2. Support of East-West trade restrictions?
3. Cooperation with the US in the *(granting and construction)* ~~construction~~ of bases and ~~and in the granting of~~ other facilities?
4. Cooperation in the Korean War or measures arising therefrom?

5. Position in UN votes?
6. Cooperation with US in policies for: (a) European federation; (b) Middle East problems; (c) Far Eastern problems.
7. Negotiation with the USSR, on individual issues or for a general presumed detente?

- B. France. *Same as A.* ~~B. France, Same as A.~~
- C. Other NATO Powers. *Same as A,* dealing with 6 to the extent applicable.
- 25X6A D. [REDACTED] *Same as A, dealing with 6 to the extent applicable.*
- E. Sweden, Switzerland, and Finland. Same as A, dealing with 1, 2, 3, and 6 to the extent applicable.
- F. Yugoslavia. *Change 1 to read: "Acceptance of US aid and continuation of present degree of cooperation with US in defence policies."; and 2, 3, 4, and 6, omitted.* *(omit conditions thereon,)*
- G. Middle East and North Africa. *Change 1 to read: "Acceptance of US aid etc.;"* *Omit 2, 4, 6 (a), and 6 (c).*
- H. South Asia. *Change 1 to read: "Acceptance of US aid etc.;"* *Omit 3, 6 (a).*
- I. Southeast and Non-Communist Asia excluding [REDACTED] 25X6A
New Zealand, and the Philippines. Change 1 to read:
"Acceptance of US aid *etc.*" ~~and continuance of present degree of~~
~~cooperation with US in defense policies.~~ *omit 2, 6 (a),*
6 (b).

25X6

- J. [REDACTED] New Zealand, and Philippines. Change 1 to read: "Acceptance of US aid, etc."; omit 6 (a), 6 (b).
- K. Latin America. Change 1 to read: "Acceptance of US aid, etc."; omit 6.

III. IN THE LIGHT OF THESE PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES AND AREAS OF THE FREE WORLD, SUMMARIZE THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE US.

C. What variations in the tactics and courses listed in A.

4 B, and what additional local ~~means~~ tactics may be employed with respect to:

25X6

1. [REDACTED]
2. France?
3. Other NATO powers?

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4. [REDACTED]
5. Sweden, Switzerland & Finland?
6. Yugoslavia?
7. Middle East & North Africa?
8. South Asia?

25X6

9. Southeast and Non-Communist Asia excluding New Zealand, and the

25X6

10. [REDACTED] Philippines? New Zealand, & the Philippines?
11. Latin America?

(A) 4. ~~Capital~~ Diplomatic and propaganda intervention in regional problems (e.g., advocacy of a "Scandinavian bloc," offers to mediate regional disputes).?

(B) 4. ~~Political~~ Diplomatic and propaganda intervention in regional problems { (e.g., support for India in India-Pakistan dispute, support for Arab ~~nations~~ and Latin American nations on behalf of one side against another in disputes with US, ~~and~~ France, etc.) } 25X6

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